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MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940 '
ABSTRACT
Competition has been considered to be the prime force
which leads to an optimal solution of the economic problem.
But the underlying assumptions used in the current equili-
brium theory are so empirical, such that in the practical
world there just is no competition as proposed by the theory.
In fact, in real life economic competition does not
exist in its pure form, but in a more realistic form instead:
the monopolistic competition. A game theoretical approach
is implemented to find answers to the issues of this
particular phenomenon.
Petroleum environment in Indonesia provides the structures
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This paper explores the issues of the economic theory
that free competition has become recognized as just a limit-
ing case of an economic organization. One main reason for
rejecting the study of more aspects of competition is that
it fails to explain the phenomenon of bargaining which per-
vades all of economic life. Wherever bargaining occurs
there is no pure competition.
Chapter Two reviews briefly the basic classical mecha-
nism in securing the maximum efficiency under competition.
Violations of the preconditioned assumptions for pure
competition will result in forming other kinds of market
structure: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly are also
considered.
Utility theory, principles of individual and group
rationalities, dominance and stable sets leading to the
theory of the core are stressed in the third chapter as an
exposition of the game theory.
Chapter Four deals with the historical background of
the petroleum industry in Indonesia and the existence of a
monopolistic competition among state enterprises. A summary
of data serves for an analytical model discussed in the
following chapter is also presented.

Chapter Five derives the conditions of an equilibrium
in a non-competitive form of a market; a process of showing
the non-empty set of solutions, choosing a solution that
has the biggest monopolist's power and ends up in a collusion,
The last chapter discusses how and when players in an
economic game should collude or compete, and concludes the
justification of the collusion in the petroleum industry.

II. THE ECONOMICS OF A MARKET
Any economy, whatever its cultural and political
traditions may be, must solve the following so-called economic
problems
:
(a) What end products to produce, and how much of each
to produce both in current and future time periods.
(b) How to produce each end product, and specifically
how to allocate resources.
(c) How to divide up end products among the members of
society.
One way to solve the problem is through the market
system approach. Under this approach, a market is an eco-
nomic environment that consists of two sets of participants:
the firms that produce and the consumers. It involves two
broad conceptions, one emphasizing the conducts of the sel-
lers and buyers, the other the market structures. The sel-
lers and buyers make their decisions in response to prices
which are the results of the interaction of supply and de-
mand forces on the market. Each participant seeks to make
the best of the market conditions, by maximizing profit or
subjective utility. This process is just like making a
contract and remaking it until no participant can make him-
self better off. The process of contracting and recontracting
is usually referred to as a tatonnement process. If initial

contracts do not lead to an equilibrium in the sense of
clearing the market, i.e., equating supply and demand,
pairings of buyers and sellers; they are called off and new
contracts are made. This situation repeats itself until no
excess supply or demand is supposed to exist. And during
that process the aggregations of participants are accom-
plished through bargaining, forming coalitions which will
result in several types of market structures. Major mar-
ket structures are defined in terms of the number of sellers
and buyers. Treating the number of sellers to be a variable
and the buyers infinite, there exist two extreme cases of
market structures: if there is only one seller then it denotes
a monopoly, if there are many sellers it denotes a competitive
market.
This paper is concerned only in the number of firms and
the quantity they produce.
A. COMPETITIVE MARKET
Figure 1A and IB review the conventional analysis of an
equilibrium in a competitive market. At the beginning the
market is observed to have a short run supply curve S,
,
which constitutes the summation of all firms' marginal cost
curves. The market price 0X
1
is viewed by the firms as a
given parameter. The firm maximizes its profit by producing
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OQ, , i.e., operates at marginal cost MC equals the market
price. It receives profit as large as per unit profit GC
times the number of units produced 0Q-, . In short run the
market is said to be in equilibrium if the excess demand is
zero. In long run, the market is in equilibrium if the ex-
cess demand is zero and each firm in the market earns zero
profit. Because the profit in Fig. 1A is positive, then it
can not be a long run equilibrium. New firms will be in-
duced to enter the market, adding new marginal costs to the
supply curve which results in shifting it to S
?
. Entries
will continue expanding firms' output, driving the price
into equality to the average total cost ATC . The firm operates
at MC equals the price 0X
?
by producing 0Q 2 at zero profit.
In the long run, if price changes the process of adjustment











SAC - short run average cost
LAC - long run average cost
LMC - long run marginal cost
X.
Figure IB
the firms move to a new short run equilibrium the intersec-
tion of S. and D
?
. As investment leads to a new industry-
capacity, the capital expansion brings about a shift in
second phase from S. to S~. Price will once again reach a
long run equilibrium position. If the long run supply
curve (LS) is horizontal then it defines a constant-cost
industry, i.e., the long run equilibrium price tends towards
some constant level as the industry expands. There are also
cases where LS increases or decreases depending upon the
formation of the new S^.
For a market to be competitive, the following conditions
must hold:
(a) There must be many firms acting independently, and
each firm is small enough relative to the size of the market,
12

(b) Entry into (and exit from) the market must be free.
(c) There is no collusion among the sellers or buyers.
(d) The goods produced are divisible and each unit is
homogeneous
.
(e) General knowledge of the market prices must exist
among sellers and buyers.
(f) Market prices must be free to vary in response to
changes in market forces.
(g) Market prices are independent from the actions of
the sellers and buyers.
A competitive market, in the long run equilibrium state,
has the following three general properties:
(a) The cost of producing the last unit of output is
equal to the price paid by consumer for that unit.
(b) The price being equal to the average total cost
avoids the supra-normal economic profits.
(c) Each firm produces output at the minimum point on
its ATC curve. Thus resources are employed at maximum
production efficiency.
It is the product of the current theory in saying that
the market alone allocates resources optimally, presumably
under free competition. If this is to be a description of
reality, then it must also explain the consequences of the
existence of monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly. Furthermore,
the view also overlooks the phenomenon of' prices being
13

formed by political processes, a surrogate market mechanism.
The existence of governments, local or national are completely
forgotten in the sense that their influences are being
ignored.
B. MONOPOLY
Monopolists differ from the competitive firms in one
essential respect: the firm is the supplier of the industry's
output. Figure 2 shows the appropriate curves used in the
discussion
* Figure 2
The monopolist maximizes its profit by setting X, the





where Q - the quantity produced, then the profit function:
P = R - TC
where R - firm's revenue, TC - firm's total cost, functions
of Q. The necessary condition for maximized profit is
3P/3Q = 0.
Thus,
3R/3Q = 3(TC)/3Q, or MR = MC
that is: marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Revenue is R = XQ, so that:
M = X + Q 3X/3Q = X(l + | H) = X(l + 1/e)
Thus, for a monopolist to define his new profit maximized
output when the demand function shifts, he needs to know
the price elasticity c at various prices.
Suppose the firm does have a linear demand function:
X = a - bQ
where a and b are positive constants, X and Q are as defined.
Its revenue:
R = aQ - bQ 2
Its marginal revenue: MR = X + Q(dX/dQ) = a - 2bQ. The
firm with market power knows that to sell an additional
unit of output, it must reduce its price to the customer for
that unit. If it is unable to practice price discrimination,
the firm must also reduce the price to all customers, who
would have bought the product even without price reduction.
Thus, the marginal revenue is equal to the price paid by

the marginal customer plus the change in price necessary to
attract him multiplied by the number of units which would
have been sold without the corresponding price reduction.
The profit maximizing firm will expand its output as
long as the marginal revenue exceeds the addition to cost
from producing that unit. The monopolist finally operates
at MR = MC, which implies that X, > MC . He actively seeks
for a maximum net return, having a choice of output and
giving the least total cost for the total output. Therefore
maximum net revenue (= profit) and maximum efficiency are
consistent.
C. DUOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY
Assuming that firms seek to maximize profits, when either
competition or monopoly prevails there exist solutions to
the firms' price and output decision problem. With rivalry
among the few the case is different. Each firm recognizes
that its best choice depends upon the choices its rivals make.
The firms are interdependent, and their decisions depend on
the assumptions they make about the rivals' decisions and
reactions. The argument then involves a duopoly (when
there are two firms) or an oligopoly (when there are more
than two firms)
.
Figure 3 shows an example of a duopoly situation. Let
each monopolist assume that he knows the market demand
16

curve and his competitior ' s output. Also each chooses his
profit maximizing output on the assumption that his competitor's





Suppose the firms' demand functions are:
Firm 1: X = 200 - 0.04 Q,
Firm 2: X = 200 - 0.04 Q 2
Although the firms' demand functions are of the same form,
as it will be shown that each firm will have less profit if
it adopts its rival's price. The market's demand function:
X = 200 - 0.02(Q
1
+ Q 2 ). Further, let:
TC
1
= 50,000 + 20 Q ± + 0.01 Q^
TC
2




= 20 + 0.02 q
MC
2
= 40 + 0.04 Q 2
As a monopolist, firm 1 operates at MR, = 200 - 0.08 Q, = MC,,
17

which resolves: X, = $128,- and Q, = 1800 units. If firm
2, having the same demand function, were to behave as firm
1 does, then X- = $128,- and Q~ = 1800 units. But that is
not the case. Firm 2 has its own cost function. In
similar manner, firm 2 will have:
X' = $147,- and Q^ = 1333' units
The profits are shown:
Price/unit Firm l's profit Firm 2's profit Total profit
128 112,000 73,600 185,600
147 100,950 86,667 187,617
It is clear that each firm is worse off at its rival's price.
Hence each would prefer to see its own favored price set on
the market. This becomes a conflict situation. One way to
solve it, is for the firms to get a compromise among their
conflicting preferences through meetings, collusive agreements
or bargaining. But this means a sacrifice in pricing inde-
pendence. Another way is for the firm preferring the lowest
price to impose its will on the other firm. This is plausible,
since customers will surely come to a lower price seller, so
that the firm with the lowest price preference has a distinct
advantage over its rival. If the firm with the high price
attempts to hold the price, up despite its market share
lossess, the low price firm is forced to get more customers
and hence supply more than the quantity of output which
maximizes its profit. Or if the high price firms is
18

disatisf ied with its profit at the low price firm's favored
price, it may threaten its rival to get into more appropriate
cooperation.
The joint profit equation:
(Q 1 +Q 2 ) (200-0. 02(Q 1 +Q 2 )) - (50000+20Q 1 +0 . 01Q^) - (20000+40Q 2 +0 . 02Q 2 )
When this function is maximized with respect to their output,
the optimal values are:
Q 1 = 2500 and Q 2 = 750
The market price is found from the market demand function:
X - 200 - 0.02(2500+750) = $135,-
The joint profit is $215,000- which is distributed:
Firm l's profit: $175,000,-
Firm 2's profit: $ 40,000,-
Firm 2 can surely do better at its own preferred price or
even at its rival's, and it is not apt to cooperate in the
joint effort. Thus, when marginal costs vary among firms,
it is conceivable that no set of price-quantity choices
consistent with independent actions taken by the firms
will maximize collective profits.
Within oligopolistic market, where more than two firms
get into the market, conflicts arise which unless resolved
through collusive agreement, will interfere with the
maximization of collective monopoly profits.
But most real economic situations are composite of both
competition and monopoly. Markets that are neither purely
19

competitive nor pure monopolies belong in the broad category
called monopolistic competition. The most typical features
of monopolistic competition are:
(a) The interdependency among the firms in the market.
(b) The uncertainty about the actions of one's rivals.
It is the purpose of this paper to study monopolistic
competition within a petroleum market using game theoretical
language as a tool of analyses. For that reason, the exposition
of game theory in the following chapter is in order.
20

III. CONCEPTS OF GAME THEORY
A. THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND
The word game is associated to rules, players, moves,
strategies, pay-offs, some concepts of competition and
cooperation, and the importance of information. So, a game
contains the concept of a conflict situation in economic
life.
1 . General Features
Game theory is concerned with situations which have
the following features :
a. There must be at least two players. The word
player is used to denote a separate decision making unit in
the context of the game. A player wishes to maximize some
objectives and is in control of certain actions which
influence the result of the game.
b. The game begins as one or more players make a
choice among a number of specified alternatives. The methods
and ways to conduct the game are described in the rules of the
game, those are descriptions of what constitute a player's
move, his state of information prior to his choice of move
from a set of alternatives, and also his pay-off configuration
c. After the choice associated with the first move
is made, a certain situation results. This situation determines
21

who is to make the next move and also what alternatives
are available to him according to the rules given.
d. The choices made by the players may or may not
become known. In an economic situation, a player may be
able to guess with probabilistic certainty about other
players' moves. Games in which all choices of all players
are known to everyone as soon as they are made, are called
games of perfect information. These games are distinguished
from the opposite category of games: games of imperfect
information
.
e. The rules of the game include a termination rule
which denotes that the game ends. And prescribed to that
termination rule is a condition that determines a pay-off
to each bonafide player, i.e., a player who makes choices
and receives pay-offs. In an economic situation, these
pay-offs may constitute profits in money value or in other
measures of utility.
2 . Utilities
In game theory it is assumed that the magnitude
assigned to the pay-off denote the worth of that pay-off
to the respective player. Since it bears a concept of
magnitude then it requires a specification of the scale to
be used. Utilities are pay-offs measured in an interval
scale, which have the following properties:
22

a. A system U of some entities u, v, w,... .etc.
In U a relation is given: u >» v; and for any
number 6, < 8 < 1, ther is an operation: 6 u + (l-6)v = w.
Those entities satisfy the following axioms:
(1) Complete ordering:
(a) For any two entities one and only one
of the follosing relations holds: u = v, or u«<v, or
u >»v.
(b) u )*® v, v >=• w implies that u >» w.
(2) If u ^>v >»w, then exists an 6 such that
Su+ C 1 - 3) w y» v
b. Those axioms imply the existence of a correspondence
between the entities and a real valued function V, such that:
(1) If u>®v, then V(u) > V(v)
(2) V(6 u + (l-S)v) = 6V(u) + (l-S)V(v)
Or in words, a set of pay-offs that comprises
a preference relation on U which is linear and transitive,
is associated with a utility function V, which is invariant
with respect to a linear transformation.
3 . Strategies
The importance of the idea of strategy comes from
the resulting conceptualization of a game. A plan of moves
may contain rigid actions if it has a few contingent deci-
sions. In game theory flexibility is irrelevant to the
notion of a strategy. A strategy already contains in it
23

all contingencies which can possibly arise. Everything
that can happen in the course of a game is known. What is
not known, is the way the opposing player will actually
choose each of his moves. A strategy is a plan that provides
for every possible choice on the part of the other player,
essentially it is a complete description of the course of
action.
Suppose a set of players is specified by:
I = (1 , 2 , . . .n)











A utility function V is defined on a termination of the
game:
V -(,... , S - , . . . , S,,...J U
where the i player is to receive u utiles when he uses his
j strategy, while the other players pick their own
strategies
.
For simplicity, denote the rest of the strategies of
k ththe (I-i) players by s . The best response of the i
k iplayer with respect to s
,
is s* such that:
Vi (sj, s
k





), for Vs 1 e S
jL
Strategy s is dominant with respect to s , if:
o
V 4 (si, s
k
) > V, (s\ s k ), for \/s k e S,




a. Individual rational behavior.
Each player will make his choice among strategies
available to him that will give him the biggest pay-off.
b. Group rational behavior.
If by colluding the players will be better
off than what they get alone, then they tend to make up
for cooperation.
The process of cooperation may take several forms.
The two extreme cases are: if the players in a game act
and behave individually, i.e., there is no binding agree-
ment, no negotiation or trust and no communication is
possible among the players, the game is called non-coopera-
tive; if all the players constitute one compact decision
making unit, the game is called bargaining game. The physi-
cal realization of cooperation is called coalition. Thus
the set of players I can be partitioned into coalitions in
various coalition structures.
B. THEORY OF THE CORE
1 . Characteristic function .
One level in the game theory where conflict situa-
tions are discussed in an abstract form is called the theory
of games in characteristic function form. In this frame-
work, the strategies available to the players are also
abstracted. The only givens of the game are the pay-offs
25

which each of the several possible coalitions can assure for
himself. The utiles of the pay-off are assumed to be in
some conservative and transferable quantity, so that
additivity property of pay-offs in a coalition is applicable
The specification of minimum joint pay-offs which
can accrue to each possible coalition constitutes the char-
acteristic function of the game. This function acts as the
utility function that transforms a set of players into real
numbers, expressing a pay-off in terms of some utiles.
Let a game be played by n players:
I = (1, 2, . . . , n)
The characteristic function is defined as:
,1 (1)W : I * R
such that
(a) W(0) =
(b) W(I) = K
(c) W(S) + W(T) < W(SOT), when SaT =
(super-additivity property)
where S, TC I and if W(S) + W(S) = K, S- the complement of
S with respect to I, the game that has this additional
property is called constant sum game.
The principle of individual rationality implies
that no player can be induced to accept any pay-off which is
less then the value of the characteristic function on that
26

player -- the value of the game to him. But in some way,
group rationality also drives the players to bargain in forming
coalition which may give him a higher pay-off.
Let any disbursement of pay-off among the n players










where z- - the pay-off to the i player.
Individual rationality is expressed as:
z.
_> W(i) , i = 1, 2,..., n (3)
Group rationality is expressed as:
£ z. _> W(S), for S a coalition. (4)
ieS 1
In particular, a bargaining may form in a grand coalition,
then:
Z z i = w ^) . ^
iel
2. Stable Se t.
The set of disbursements that satisfies equations
(3) and (5) is called the set of imputations. A pay-off
->
vector Z, in the form of equation (2), that belongs to
this set is called an imputation.
The concept of dominace is extended to be applicable in
the set of imputations.
Let the. set of imputations be:
?Z= dl z. > W(i),2z. = W(I)) (6 )
27

Let S be a coalition, a subset of the set of all players I




when the following holds:
z
±
> y i , V i e S
ieS
Define the dominion of Z via coalition S to be





Z = (f e £T/2 dom
s
?) (8)
Dom Q R = \J Dom Q Z (9)
Dom R = \J DomQ R (10)
Sel b
R, a subset of the imputation set kT, is stable if:
R D Dom R =
R U Dom R = X
3. The Core of the Game.
(11)
The set of disbursements that satisfies equations
(3), (4) and (5) is called the core of the game. Since it
satisfies equation (6) , then the core of the game is
contained in the imputation set £2-.
Equation (4) implies that the corresponding imputa-
tion Z is the best imputation via coalition S. In other
28

words, no player can be better off, except by those
imputations which are in the core. Accordingly the
core C also satisfies equations in (11). Thus,
C C R
R H Dom C =
(12)
In general, there is a number od redundant inequal-
ities described by the imputations in the core. A substan-
tially smaller set of inequalities is sought, which can
produce necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a non-empty core. The objective is then to find an im-
putation among imputations in the set of imputations, which
will give insights of the situation of conflicting players.
The core being a subset of any stable set (12) is only a
solution concept. In the succeeding discussions the core
will be associated with a balanced set by which the non-emptiness
of the core can be shown.
4 . Further Development of the Game .
Sometimes, in order to simplify the theory and to be
able to compare different games conveniently, the value of










Since the characteristic function acts as a utility function,
then it is invariant with respect to a linear transformation.
Hence:
W (i) = 3 W(i) + y
±
=
W'(I) = 3 W(I) + 2- Y-: = 1
iel x
A game is said to be normalized when:
W(i) = 0, ^ iel and W(I) = 1 (14)
Thus any game can be transformed to its normalized form by
using the constant defined in (13).
The inequality mentioned in (lc) has a weak meaning,
in the sense that the equality part does not add any in-
formation. If two coalitions will receive just the same
pay-offs when they collude, then they need not do that in
the first place. It is more apropriate to express [1(2]:
W(SUT) > W(S) + W(T), when SfXT = (15)
The game that has this property is called essential. If
the equality applies the game is called inessential.
In general, inessential game will have the following
equility
:





-'Us., S ASk = 0, for j f k




Then, the players in an essential game are motivated
to form blocking coalition, a coalition whose inputations
are in the core of the game.
Let a game G(I,W) be described by the set of players
I and its characteristic function W. If the game is normalized
then equations in (14) are applicable. Assume further that
this game is essential, so that equation (15) applies:
W(S) + W(S) < 1
where S - as defined in (1)
.
A theorem is proposed:
THEOREM 1: All constant sum, essential games have
empty cores.
Proof:
Suppose that an imputation Z is in the core. Then
the following will hold; using the notation in (7):
z
i
> 0, V i
Z(S) > W(S)
Z(S) > W(S)
The sum of the right hand side can never reach 1, which
implies that: Z(I) >_ W(I) f 1. This contradicts the
definition of the core. Since Z is arbitrary, then it is
concluded that the core is empty. QED.
For this reason, then the game that will be dealt is
non-constant sum and essential.
31

C. AN ILLUSTRATION OF TRADING SITUATION
The classical propostition of a competitive market is that
there exists a common price in the market. And this is accom-
plished by assuming that the supply curve consists of the sum-
mation of many firms' marginal cost curves. When there are
only a few firms, market price may depend on individual action.
Core theory is advantageous since it applies to any number of
firms
.
The following example shows how core theory comes to a
solution of a market game, where a unit good is being exchanged.
Suppose there are a seller A and two buyers B, and B~. The





















) = max. (a,b,,b
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in buying the one unit from A.
Assume further that a < b, < b
? ,
and Z = (z,y,,y
? )
an





y 1 1 °
y 2
>
z + y l - b l
z + y 2 > b 2
y
x







The last equality is due to the group rationality and b~
being the highest price as assumed, which implies:
y1 i o







b, < z < b
2
This set of equations is the solution of the game: seller A
successfully sold the good to B
2
obtaining the highest bid.
B-, although failed to get the good, his presence narrowed down
the range of price.
It is instructive to consider collusion between B, and B
?
.
Let B- being the more eager buyer agree to retain his bidding
so that B, can get the good at a lower price. B, pays A
a price X-,
, a < X, < b, . B
?










But this situation will never happen, since A and B
?
can be
better off by trading at a price z , b, < z < X~, which forces
the solution back to the core.
The main direction in the application of n-person game
theory has been towards social and behavioral sciences. Most
of the known solution concepts have found applications to
economics. The formulation of economic problems as games has
clarified many points and frequently various game solutions




IV. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Petroleum industry in Indonesia is not organized under
purely competitive conditions. Although the government
takes a particular interest in the firms to ensure their
profit makings no natural monopoly has emerged. The structure
of the petroleum market can best be categorized within
monopolistic competition.
Before applying the game theoretical tools developed in
the previous chapter on a realistic situation of petroleum
environment, a relevant understanding of how the petroleum
industry comes into being is desirable.
A. HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY
Oil was discovered by Zylker , a Dutchman, in North
Sumatra as early as the year 1883. Since then, international
companies have entered to make profits, such as Royal Dutch Co
in 1890, Shell Transport d, Trading Co. in 1907, B(ataffsche)
P(etroleum) M(aatschappij ) in 1911 and Standard Oil
(STANVAC) in 1912.
In 1930 the Dutch government in Indonesia created
N(ederlands) I(ndiesche) A(ardolie) M(aatschappij ) , a govern-
ment type company that controlled the oil activities through
its counterpart BPM, a private profit making company with
35

50-50 profit sharing. BPM on the other hand contracted
N(ederlandsche) K(oloniale) P(etroleum) M(aatschappij )
,
N(ederlandsche) P(acific) P(etroleum) M(aatschappij ) which
were subsidiaries of STANVAC and CALTEX respectively, with
a 40-40-20 profit sharing for BPM, NKPM and NPPM.
In 1938, BPM being the sole contractor raised its shares
by 72-28 in its favor.
Between the years 1942-1945, during the Japanese invasion
crude oil production fell from 30 million barrels to 20
million barrels annually.
In 1945, Indonesia proclaimed her independence. The oil
production was worst in the interval of 1945-1947, it
produced only 7-8 million per year.
The existing companies operating in the country consisted
of three national companies: PERTAMIN, PERMIGAN and PERMINA
and their counterparts: STANVAC, SHELL and CALTAX. NIAM
was transformed into PERMINDO a state enterprise which also
acted as partner for all foreign companies.
From the year 1948, crude oil production took off from
31 million barrels to 394 million barrels in 1972.
B. TYPES OF CONCESSION AND CONTRACT AGREEMENT
Early concession agreements were in general relatively
simple documents. They usually gave exclusive rights of
exploration and development over large areas of the host
country. The common form of obligation for the foreign
36

companies was to pay royalties on the oil produced, which
might be combined with a bonus payment upon signing. The
concession period varied between 40 years to 75 years.
The changing shares of crude oil production over the
years can be seen from the following percentages:
Company 1925 1958 1957 1963
SHELL 95 72 23 26
NIAM 10 3
STANVAC 5 28 20 11
CALTEX 47 55
PERMINA 5
The relationship between the government and the foreign
companies can be categorized into:
1 . Prior to 1960 agreements .
After the war in 194 5, when the Indonesian took
government, it was realized that foreign companies suffered
a severe loss in terms of damaged plants and oil fields. A
rapid reconstruct ion of the industry had to be arranged
immediately. The rehabilitation of war damaged installations
were very expensive in terms of foreign exchange. There-
fore, the "let alone" agreement was proposed: the companies
were permitted to retain the foreign exchange they received
from the oil sales abroad for an agreed number of years, on




However, the "let alone" agreement eventually came
to an end. Individual companies faced different situations:
a. STANVAC arrangements ran to an end in 1951.
But the company obtained a general permit to spend foreign
currency on imports of equipment and services necessary to
maintain and develop petroleum operation, and was granted
a ten-year exemption from import duties on its supplies
of capital goods and materials. In return, the company
agreed to undertake a three-year development program
estimated to cost $80 million.
b. At the end of 1953, CALTEX let alone agreement
expired. The company signed a five-year agreement for
foreign exchange matters on the STANVAC model including free-
dom from import duties. CALTEX also agreed to turn over
$60 million worth of acceptable foreign exchange in lieu of
building a refinery.
c. SHELL had its let alone agreement expired at the
end of 1955. No precise information exists concerning
the nature of its agreements with the government. But
presumably the arrangement adopted were the same as for the
other two companies.
The new agreements were considered advantageous with
respect to import duties, expenditures on new equipments,
exploration services and remittances of dividends to the
parent companies overseas. So long as the rehabilitation
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of the industry continued and crude oil exports could con-
tinue to earn substantial foreign exchange, the large pe-
troleum companies retained a strong position face to face
the government. However, the government negotiated a new
profit division which amounted to something around 50-50
division of net revenue with the companies.
2 . Post 1960 Agreements
Starting in 1959, the government undertook a number
of contracts and long term agreements with foreign oil
companies other than SHELL, STANVAC and CALTEX. They included
a technical and financial assistance contract in 1960 between
PERMINA and a Japanese group to rehabilitate the former
SHELL fields in North Sumatra, in return for deliveries
of crudes. This was one of the first production sharing
between the host government and foreign enterprise.
The legislation of Law no. 44 of 1960, concerning pe-
troleum and gas mining, changed the legal status of foreign
companies by stipulating that for the future all foreign
companies could only act as contractors and could no longer
have concession rights. The new law was exercised on the
arrangements conducted between PERTAMIN and Pan American
International, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana. Pan
American did not get the concession rights, it could only
make a contract to work for and supply PERTAMIN. This
contract is of special interest, because it created the pro-




The agreement gave Pan American a thirty-year
exploration and development contract in a prospecting area
of Sumatra. The area convered a total of 816 million acres,
including a small off-shore sector of 8,436 acres adjacent
to and partly surrounding CALTEX fields. Pan American con-
tracted to pay $10 million bonus for its rights to explore
and develop: $5 million at the time of ratification of
the contract and another $5 million to be paid at the end
of the first year in which oil exports averaged 15,000 bar-
rels per day. The exploration period was arranged for six
years with provision for two year extension and carried an
investment for exploration of $28.5 million at the minimum.
The contract was based on 60-40 profit division in favor
of PERTAMIN.
Against this background of production sharing
agreement the three major oil companies negotiated with the
government to produce the following documents:
a. Each of the three companies gave up its concession
rights granted under the old agreement, and agreed instead
to acts as contractor for:
(1) CALTEX - PERMINA
(2) STANVAC - PERTAMIN
(3) SHELL - PERMIGAN
b. In exchange, they were awarded twenty year con-
tracts to continue the exploitation of the old concession
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areas. They were permitted to apply for thirty year contracts
to explore and develop new areas adjacent to existing old
concession areas. The new area contracts required immediate
payment of cash bonuses of $5 million, and another $5
million when commerical production was established.
c. Marketing and distribution facilities were to
be handed over to the national companies within five years
at agreed prices.
d. Refinery assets would be transferred within ten
to fifteen years according to agreed terms.
e. The operating prof its of the international
companies would be divided, as from June 1963, in the ratio 60:40
for the government and the company. But in any event the
government receives a minimum payment of 20% of the gross
value of the crude oil produced in any one year by a foreign
company.
3 . Current Situation .
In 1966, a new outlook on foreign participation in
the oil industry appeared. The government realized how the
oil industry had become an important contribution to the
nation's economy. (In the last decade oil export averaged
58.5% dollar value of the total.) Since most of the explor-
ation and extraction of oil take place in remote areas and
desolate coastlines, foreign investment in petroleum provides




In August 1968, the three national companies were
merged under the name of PERTAMINA that acted as the sole
national company, exercising two new policies: first, the
exploration developments are intensified mainly on off-
shore areas, second, any foreign company may become con-
tractor and explorer as long as it operates on agreed terms.
Among the new foreign companies are: Mobil Oil Corporation,
Companie Francaise des Petroles, Union Oil, Continental
Oil, Sinclaire-Phillips , Japex, Kyushu.
The new terms of agreements in some degree are pro-
duction sharing agreements, although export sales would
probably take place through the foreign company. To cover
exploration and production costs, 401 of the crude sales
from a given contractual area is taken by the contractor.
Of the remaining 60%, the contractor retains 35% and the
65% goes to PERTAMINA. If production rises above 75,000
barrels per day the latter shares become 32.5-67.5. Produc-
tion bonuses of $1.2 and $2.75 million are due when production
reaches 30,000 and 60,000 barrels per day respectively.
The periods of exploration and exploitation are generally
ten and twenty years.
Several distinct features of the Indonesian oil and
oil producing environments can be stated as:
(a) Most production comes from relatively shallow
depth, less than 3,000 feet.
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(b) The oil structures are typically small and
scattered.
(c) The quality of the crude: Average degrees of
API = 33.4, Sulpher contents = 0.001, Pour point = 95-105°F,
Gasoline yeilds = 65%.
(d) Transportation and distribution costs are
relatively expensive.
C. COST ANALYSIS IN OIL PRODUCTION
The oil production process is conventionally divided
into three stages: exploration, development and extraction.
Exploration involves finding crude reserves by geological
and geophysical prospecting methods and ultimately by dril-
ling. Once reserves are found, producing capacity must be
extablished, a field is developed by drilling additional
wells on some specified pattern and providing equipment to
gather, process and transport the crude. These first two
stages overlap. Extraction, the final stage in the process,
involves services that must be performed concurrently with
the taking of the crude. These include pumping costs,
maintenances area supervision and where necessary, treatment
of wells to improve productivity.
The cost of crude oil is measured by the replacement
cost [2]: current exploration costs/barrels added to proved
reserves through discoveries, plus current development
costs/barrels added to proved reserves through extension and
revision, plus current production costs/barrels produced.
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Exploration costs are not directly assignable to crude
production, although the expenses incurred affect the level
of the other cost component. The main product of explora-
tion effort is knowledge of a certain structure whether it
is productive or not. The emphasis is placed on the develop-
ment costs relative to the extraction costs, since the
latter are barely significant if compared to the former.
Development outlays, as a type of capital formation,
generate future production, so that the cost must be imputed
to each barrel of crude produced.
A formal statement of a measure of development costs is
as follows:
Let J - development investment
q(t) - output of crude at time t attributable to J
-rt
e - discount factor applied to returns at time t
with discount rate r
c - development costs per barrel of crude




C = J / / q(t)e TZ dt (17)
o
In essence, the development cost which represents the
production cost per unit of crude oil is inversely proportional
to the output of crude.
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D. SUMMARY OF DATA
1. Total Crude Oil Production .
The data presented are taken from volumes of "World
Oil" of 1955 through 1969 and "PERTAMINA Oil Statistics",
Statistics Division § Information Center, Jakarta, 1972.






















2. National Companies' Production,
a. PERMINA:


























































Monopoly and pure competition are discussed in Chapter
II. Monopolistic competition is to be associated with a
game as exposed in Chapter III. Since the conditions
of monopolistic competition are distinctly different from
those of pure competition or monopoly, it is necessary to
make different assumptions concerning the model. As the
range between the two opposite market structures encompass
an extremely large variety of possible market conditions,
there also exists a large number of environmental and be-
havioral specifications that may be used in setting up
suitable theoretical constructs for analyzing various as-
pects of monopolistic competition. It is this diversity of
situations that causes the absence of a general theory of
monopolistic competition. Instead, there are different
models and theories each designed to deal with a particular
type of monopolistically competitive market.
A. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION VS GAME
Let a group of firms own some goods that they may ex-
change among themselves in any mutually agreeable way.
Every firm seeks for a maximum gain by exchanging. The
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result is a redistribution of goods among the firms that
agree on the terms of the exchange. The process describes
the firms forming a coalition that allocates or imputes the
goods to its members. The goods may comprise physical goods
or any other form of utility.
The freedom to exchange with any firm is the same as
the freedon to join any coalition. Therefore, a firm will
join that coalition offering it the best terms. The form-
ing and dissolving of coalitions is equivalent to contracting
and recontracting. The process continues until no firm can
be better off by exchanging. The resulting set of coalitions
and the allocations prescribed by the imputations constitute
the core of the market. The set of all possible contracts
resulting from the firms' pursuit of their interests is
fundamental to a competitive market. The collision of self-
interests force the imputations into the core. Thus, the
core of the market contains all possible competitive equilibria.
Among those coalitions, whose imputations lie in the
core, there may exist one particular firm that has the big-
gest power to prevent other coalitions, in which it is a
member, from getting their guaranteed gains by the core.
This particular firm is the monopolist, whose strength lies
in his bargaining power created by the harm he can cause by
refusing to exchange. Hence, the monopolist's power is measured
by the difference between what others can get with him and what
they can get without him. These combined behavioral phenomena
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i.e., producing a monopolist within the context of competitive
equilibria, comprise the monopolistic competition in
economic sense.
There are three main mathematical problems which are
encountered in studying games:
(a) The question of a general existence theorem,
that is one would like to prove that any particular game in
a certain model has at least one non-empty subset of
imputation which is the solution of the game.
(b) One is interested in the mathematical nature
of the various sets that form the solution of the game; i.e.,
is
.
the set feasible or do the values converge.
(c) One would like to be able to determine explicitly
the solution set(s) for the game.
B. CONCEPT OF A SOLUTION
In deriving the explanation of the presence of
monopolistic competition, the following train of arguments
is used:
(a) Showing the existence of the non-empty core
of the game.
(b) Constructing a mechanism to get the players to
compare their bargaining powers in forming coalitions which




(c) Showing the condition of the imputation via
that particular coalition, such that it is still an element
of the core.
Before proceeding, some additional concepts of what are
called solutions are appropriate.
1. Balanced Set .
In the attempt to find a solution of a game, one
searches among the sets of imputations to get into the core.
Unfortunately, many games have empty cores, so that this
abstract concept of finding a solution is in vain. Ways
are sought to get a measure to check the non-emptiness of
the core. One of those ways is the application of linear
programming method to the theory of the core.
Suppose in a general n-person game, Z denotes an
imputation and W(S) denotes the characteristic function of
the coalition S. For that imputation to be in the core,
equation (4) must hold. And in addition the grand coalition
condition (5) must also be satisfied.













, the j coalition
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The number of constraints in (18) is as many as the number
of possible coalitions.
The dual problem is:
max,
s . t






Linear programming requires that the primal objective
function equals to the dual objective function. Thus,
min. E z- = max. E d. W(S.) (20)1 j/ieS. J J
Now, since equation (5) is satisfied, then (20) is less
than or equal to W(I).
Hence, having (4), (5), (18) through (20), it is concluded
that the core is not empty if and only if:
E d. W(S.) < W(I) (21)
which will be proved formally in the succeeding discussion
In the mean time names can be given to the following state-
ments. The set of coalitions (S.) is a balanced set if
it satisfies the constraints in the dual problem (19). A




2 . Assumptions of the Model
In order to be able to solve a game, some assumptions
are needed concerning the nature of the players and the
characteristic function.
a. The Nature of the Players.
The overall game involved is:
G'CI'W) (22)





. . . , -A-j^-
J







- A, - k national oil company
B, - 1 country that buys oil
D - m international company
W - the characteristic function applicable in G'
G' represents the whole situation of the world oil economy.
But this paper concerns only a subset of G':
G(I,W) (23)
where I = (A,D), A and D are as defined in (22)
W - the characteristic function applicable in G.




b. The Nature of the Characteristic Function.
(1) Within the context of discussion, it is
assumed that the product under consideration is sufficiently
homogeneous (crude oil) such that the total market demand can
be represented by a single function.
(2) The price per unit of the good sold was
earlier derived in G'(I',W) as a non-discriminated price.
Within G(I,W) the price involved is considered to be given.
(3) Within the normalized G(I,W) the charac-
teristic function is defined to be the percentage function
of the averaged annual crude production. The domain of the
function is the set of players of the corresponding coalition
C. NON-EMPTY CORE
The existence of a non-empty core is associated with the
concept of balanced set. The (essential) game G(I,W)
satisfies the following equations:
t c C,. C, the core (24)
Z(S) > W(S), S a coalition
Z(I) = W(I)
W(S) + W(T) < W(SUT), for S, Tc I, SAT f
Another theorem is proposed:
THEOREM 2: The game G(I,W) has non-empty core, if and














The notation in (7)
:
L d i Z ( S i) > Z d. W(S,) (25)j/ieS- J J j/ieS. J J
Z(S ) = £ z dieS
.
3
suggests that Z is an additive function. The constraints
in (19) implies that:




L d. Z(S,) < Z(I) = W(I) (26)
j/ieS. 3 J ~J
3
Thus, combining (25) and (26) will give (21).
The necessity part:
From (21) , the implication to (25) is immediate such
that the group rationality condition is also satisfied.
The definition of the characteristic function shows that
:
WCSj) > W(ij + W(Sj-i) (27)
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The coalition is group rational, then:
ZCSj) > W(i) + WCS-i) (28)




This is just the individual rationality.
The application of the group rationality on the whole set
of players will give:
Z(I) > W(I) (29)
But in a normalized game W(I) = 1 is the highest value of
the game. Thus
Z(I) < W(I) (30)
Equations (29) and (30) constitute the grand coalition con-
dition Z(I) = W(I). Nov/, since Z satisfies the three
properties mentioned in (3), (4) and (5), Z is in the core.
Hence the core is not empty. QED.
If a game can be shown to be balanced, then it is
guaranteed that its core is not empty.
D. THE POWER OF THE MONOPOLIST
The game is given as usual by its characteristic function
W(S), S a coalition. Every player has a certain contribution
to the value of the characteristic function o[ any forming
coalition, in which lie is a member. This contribution of
the i player to coalition S is expressed as:
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W(S) - W(S-i) (31)
f"Vt
There are many ways for the i player to be included in
any coalition S which ranges over all subsets of I.
Let the set of players be partitioned:
(i, S-i, I-S)
The corresponding numbers of players within each subset are
respectively:
CI, n'-l, n-n')
Hence, the number of ways for the i player to form a
coalition:
(1)! (n'-l) ! (n-n')
!
The number of ways to form a grand coalition is: n!
So that the probability of the i player joining coalition
(n'-l)! (n-n') !/n! (32)
The power to bargain constitutes the expected contribution
of the i player, i.e., the expression in (31) weighted by
(32) over all possible coalition; where ieS:
ft - E (n'-l)! (n-n') ! (W(S) -W(S-i) )/n ! (33)1
sci
where (f. - the bargaining power.
The power of the monopolist appears as a result of a two
step process. The first step: Members of coalitions whose
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imputations lie in the core compare their bargaining power
among themselves. The result of the first step process is
a unique coalition whose members have the biggest bargaining
power. The second step: Within this particular coalition,
the members fall into a conflict situation in deciding which
one of them becomes the leader of the coalition. This last
step process is accomplished by the usual maximization of
their profits.
1 . Subset A vs Subset D .
Recall that subset A consists of the national oil
companies: (A-,, A
? ,
AJ, and D = (D,
,
D~,..., D\,) are the
international oil companies.
Consider the subset A, i = 1, 2, 3:
W(S-i) = 0, S any coalition such
that (S-i) C D (34)
The reason for that is simply that any coalition, without the
involvement of any one of the national companies, can not
gain anything.
Then, equation (33) becomes:
Cj> = Y, (n
,
-l)!(n-n')!W(S)/n!; for i = 1,2,3
SCI
(35)
= 0, for i = 4, 5 ,... elements of D
It has become obvious that only A, , A
2
and A, have




It is worthwhile to notice the property of (p. as
a function of n'. The summation itself is an increasing
function. To show that C{p . increases whenever n' does, it
is sufficient just to observe the weight of W(S), because
the latter being the percentage function is an increasing
-k k hfunction of n'. Use the Sterling formula: k! = e k (2TTk) 2
for the weight of W(S)
:
f (n 1 ) = (n*-l) ! (n-n 1 ) !/n!
= (e(2ir)-/n )(n'-l) 2 (n-n') 2
For 1 <_ n' <_ n, it is clear that f(n') is an increasing
function. This means the more foreign companies that enter
the market, the bigger is the bargaining power for (A).
2 . Within the Subset A .
Consider the coalition (A). Its members are as-
sumed to be group and also individually rational as previously
defined in III.. A. 3. a and b, thus they are profit maximizing
companies.
Assume that: q, - the number of units of good
produced by the k company
CC !],) = Ci-Qi-j the cost of producing q, ,
a linear function of q,
.
c, - the cost per unit





X = 1 - bQ, the scaled market price per unit.
The profit function of the k company is then:
Pk (qk ) = qkX - C(qk ) (37)
= qk (l-bQ) - c kqk
= qk (l-c k -bQ)
+ Ti
The k company is called active if qk > 0, i.e., P, (q,) > 0,
or:
(l-ck -bQ) >
Q < Ock )/b (38)
Equation (37) can also be written as:
Pk (qk }
= q k (1
~ c k } " bqk ( S qk ) C39)
= (l-c k )qk - bq k (q k + £ q .
)
= C 1_ck^k " bqk " b(; .^ q j) qk
The necessary condition for a maximum of profit dPi,/dq, = 0.
Hence:
1 " c k " 2bqk " b ^ q i
=
°
or 1 - c
k
- 2bqk - b(Q-q k ) = 1 - C] . - b (Q+q k )
Q + q k U-ck)/b (40)
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From (40) one deduces that c, < 1, otherwise Q has no mean-
ing. The subscript k is arbitrary so that (40) is applicable
for all companies in (A)
.
Thus:
(Q+q,) = (1/b) £ (1-c,)
k k
K




Q = (l/b(K+l)) £ (l-c k ) (41)k=l K
where K determines the number of companies that may be
active within (A)
.
In order that equations (38) and (41) be satisfied,
then K is the smallest integer such that:
ci/b(K+i,,i ci-ck) > ci-cK+1 )/b
or
K
£ (l-c k ) > (K-l)(l-cK+1 ) (42)
Equation (4 2) is very important, in deciding how many companies
may exist and be active, and eventually which one of them
will hold the market leadership. The implication of (42)
also requires a certain condition on the c/,s.
Using the fact that < c, < 1 on equation (38)
implies the following statement: If c- < 1 and the j
61

company is active, then (38) applies. Also if (38) is
true, then the j company is active. Consequently, this
tautology implies that if the j company is active and
c- > c-t then the (j-1) company is also active. So,
before using equation (42) in determining the number of
active companies, the cost per unit of the corresponding
companies must be ordered:
1 c i < c ? < • * • < ck < * * * < C K K 1 ^ 43 ^
E. SOME NUMERICAL EXPOSITIONS
So far, the theoretical discussions which are confined
within an abstract context have explained the following
results
:
(a) The core of a game contains imputations that are
dominant than any other imputation in the imputation set.
These imputations in the core are associated with the
classical competitive equilibria. A way to show that the
core is not empty is by investigating whether the game is
a balanced game; i.e., a game that satisfies the balanced
inequalities (21).
(b) Among the core imputations there may exist one
particular imputation that corresponds to a unique coalition




(c) Those members of the particular coalition fall into
a conflict situation, where one of them may become the leader
of the coalition and dissolve the other two. The company
which has a lower production cost per unit produced, has
a bigger chance to hold the market leadership.
The above results will be applied on a realistic
situation of the petroleum industry:





A^ 5 A, , D, , D^ j U-7 J
W - the percentage of the averaged annual crude
oil production.
Since W is a percentage function, then its highest value is
1, which coincides with the value of a normalized game. W
seems to characterize a constant sum game, although it is
not really the case as will be made clear in the following
manner. If the game were constant sum, then:
W(S) + W(S) = W(I) = 1
for all possible coalition S
where S US = I. This will mean that one coalition gains
at the expense of the other. But it is just not true, be-
cause the partition (A, I)) is not proper. When W(D) = 0, the
total crude production of A will noticably diminish such
that the calculation of percentage con not be compared with
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those of other partitions. Thus, W(A) f 1, and partition
(A,D) violates the requirement for the game to be constant
sum. Hence, the game is non-constant sum.
a. For i = 1, 2, 3; i.e., A,, A~ and A,:
W(S.) < W(I) = 1




If there exists a number of positive coefficients d- such
that
I d, = 1
3
J
then the following is obviously true




In other words, according to THEOREM 1 and THEOREM 2 the
core of this game is not empty, and hence competitive
equilibrium does exist.








These percentages also show the proportion of production
capabilities among (A) . The portion produced by (D) is
1 - CO. 053+0. 033+0. 005) = 0.909, the 0.091 is by (A).
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According to the rules of agreement 651 of the 60% of crudes
produced by (D) goes to the corresponding member of (A) ; this






) = (53/91) (0.3545) = 0.2065 (45)





= ( 5/91) (0.3545) = 0.0195
It is clear that other coalition T results in W(T) = 0.
Applying equation (35)
:
= 5!0! (0.053)/6! + 4 ! 1 ! (0 . 2065) /6 ! = 0.0157
1
Cf = 5!0! (0.033)/6! + 4 ! 1 ! (0 . 1286) /6 ! = 0.0098
<f3 = 5!0! (0.005)/6! -< 4 ! 1 ! (0 . 0195) /6 ! = 0.0007
Cp
i
= 0, for i = 4, 5, 6 (46)
It concludes that the first three players have the bigger
bargaining powers. And among those players, A-, has a
chance to lead the market.
c. Using the values given in Table 5, equation (17)
and (43), then the cost per unit of crude for the corresponding


















It would have been proper if the values of c's were known,
so that the determination of which company will lead the
market can be ascertained. But, in any case the game theory
argues that at most there are only two companies with the
lowest cost per unit may become active.
d. Now that theoretical argumentation forces the
companies in (A) to collude in facing those companies in (D)
,
it will finally be shown that the imputation they get after
collusion is bigger than before. Since the comparison that
will be conducted concerns different period of time, one
tends to suspect that there may be other factors involved:
better management, improved technology etc. But the facts
remain that practically none of those factors do happen.
The companies just merge under one name and continue to
operate with their same former facilities but different uni-
fied policy. Moreover, should there be any improved factors,
their effects with respect to the discussion, are eliminated
by the characteristics of the characteristic function.
Summing (44) and (45) to get the total gains:
W(I) = 0.2595
W(2) = 0.1616 (49)
W(3) = 0.0245
During the years after the sole merger appears, the averaged
crude production data arc as the following:




For proper comparison between situations before- and after
merging, the composition of companies is assumed to be the
same for the latter case. The portion produced by (A),
from (50): 0.195, by (D) : (1-0.195) = 0.805. Using the
same production sharing rule: 65-35 of the 601 crudes, then
the total gains to (A) are: 0.195 + (65%) (60%) (0. 805) = 0.50895
The imputation for the members of (A) is found by implementing
the proportion of production capabilities (44) :
z
1
= (53/91) (0.50895) = 0.29642 (51)
z
2
= (33/91) (0.50895) = 0.18456
z
3
= ( 5/91) (0.50895) = 0.02797
It is quite obvious, by comparing (51) to (49),
the reason why the national oil companies prefer to collude
rather than individually face foreign contractors is that
z- > W(i) , for i = 1, 2, 3. That is so since other coalitions
do not exist except those mentioned in (45).
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VI. COLLUSION VS COMPETITION
Preceding chapters discuss the explanations of a parti-
cular model of monopolistic competition withing a petroleum
industry, where three oil companies collude and operate as
a single company.
But, in general, why is there not a monopoly in every
industry? In order to be able to answer the question, one
is urged to seek greater clarification of the two concepts,
collusion and competition. This, in turn encounters the
question of what determines the number of firms in an
industry.
A. THE NATURE OF COLLUSION AND COMPETITION [20]
Consider an industry in which there are n firms that
produce the same goods at constant and common price per unit:
X= F(QJ (52)
£ th




thAssume that the i firm has the total cost of the form:
C = G. (q.) (53)
The net revenue for the i' 1 firm:
R. = Xq. - C ,r A sl l i l (54)
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The necessary condition for a maximum is of course
dR./dq. = 0. Thus,
dR. d d d .
dqT
=
d^q- ^i " C.) = g^ (F (Q) q.) - ^- 6.(q.) =
and hence:








Assume further that in pursuing the maximum net revenue,
each firm acts independently; i.e.;
dqj /dqi = 1, if i
= j (56)
=0, if i f j
Now, equation (55) becomes:
X + qi (dF/dQ) - (dG i /dq i ) = (57)
Substitute into (57) the following quantites :
a- = q-/Q» the market share of firm i (58)
IF-d











If a- is so small and/or e so large, such that a.-/e = then




X = dG./dq. = MC
1 n i
If there is only one firm in the industry, a- = 1 implies
that q. = A, then the necessary condition for a maximum
becomes the condition for maximum net return of a monopoly:
X + Q(dF/dQ) - dG/dQ = 0,'or
MR = MC
If collusion could be represented by a functional relation
among the firms' outputs; e.g. in implicit form:
Y (qlf q 2 ,..., qn )
=
then the assumption in (56) is:
dq./dq
i
= 1, if i = j
= (dy/dq i )(dy/dqj ) f 0,
if i f j
also, dQ/dq. = dV/dq.
and thus equation (55) becomes:









X(l + (ai/e)(d¥/dqi )) - dG i /dq i = (61)
In any case, it is clear that the value of market share
a- is relevant in leaving the state of competition to go
towards collusion. In the particular situation of the three
oil companies, two companies have market shares above 10%
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as shown in (49) so that the factor a-/e can not be ignored,
and hence collusion is more likely than competition.
As a general rule, collusion occurs whenever it is more
profitable to all of the members than their other feasible
alternatives. For collusion to dominate competition, the
joint profit must exceed the combined competitive returns and
also none of the members may obtain a higher return by some
other strategy given that all others stick to the collusive
agreement.
B. EFFICIENT INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION [20]
Within the industry, the process of collusion forces the
k firms, k <_ n, to be active (38) while the other (n-k)
inactive. The following discussion is a generalized version
of the previous one about determining the optimal number of
firms in in the industry and the optimal allocation among
the firms for a given total output. (The crude production
is determined by PERTAMINA)
.
Let the total cost function of the industry be denoted by:
k
C(k) = £ c. (62)
i-1 1
It is convenient to index the firms with a continuous parameter
a:
k
C(k) = / c(a)N(o)da (63)
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where N(a) is the number of firms of type o
Similarly, the industry's total output:
k
Q(k) = / q(a)N(a)da (64)
The discussion inV.D.2. is a maximization problem for each
firm, whose results can also be derived from the following
non-linear programming problem: efficient industry organization
problem:
min. C(k) (65)
s.t. Q(k) >_ Q, a constant
k > ~0
q(k), positive function
The Lagrangian is given by:
k
C(k) + A(Q-/ q(o)N(a)da) (66)
where X is the Lagrange multiplier.
The necessary conditions for a minimum:
dC/dk - Aq(k)N(k) = (67)
k
dC/dq - XI N(a)da = (68)






and if those are substituted into (67) and (68)
:
(c(k) - Xq(k))N(k) =
k
/ ((dc/dq) - A)N(a)da =
which result in:
dc/dq = A, for all a, <_ a < k (69)
dc/dq = c(k)/q(k)
In words, the first condition means that for all active
firms there must be a common marginal cost. This can be
checked for the particular case in (40), A = -2b, Va _< k.
The second condition is applicable for the marginal firm,
that is the last firm that it just pays to operate. If
initially the firms' index is ordered with respect to their
minimum average cost, the condition means that the marginal
firm operates at the largest minimum average cost. This





The model proposed involves a specific form of monopo-
listic competition. It discusses one set of participants,
the producing firms. This set consists of two types of
players, whose conflict behaviors are explained within the
context of a game. The first type of players, the national
oil companies: PERMINA, PERTAMIN and PERMIGAN compete among
themselves in their joint ventures to produce crude oil with
the second type of players, the foreign investors.
The paper successfully justifies the merging of the
three companies into PERTAMINA, and that collusion is
preferable to continual competition.
For future studies, the discussion could be deepened and
broadened to get into the bargaining process itself, instead
of accepting the results as givens. The possibility of
the model to be used as a tool of prediction could also
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